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Matched employer-employee data 
a b s t r a c t 
The extent to which employers share rents with their employees is typically assessed by estimating the respon- 
siveness of workers ’ wages on firms ’ ability to pay. This paper compares rent-sharing estimates using such a wage 
determination regression with estimates based on a productivity regression that relies on standard firm-level in- 
put and output data. Using a large matched firm-worker panel data sample for French manufacturing, we find 
that the respective industry distributions of the rent-sharing estimates are correlated and slightly overlap, but are 
significantly different on average. Precisely, if we only rely on the firm-level information, we obtain an average 
rent-sharing estimate of roughly 0.30 for the productivity regression and 0.17 for the wage determination regres- 
sion. When we also take advantage of the worker-level information to control for unobserved worker ability in 
the model of wage determination, we find as expected a lower average value of 0.10. 










































Contrary to the Walrasian labor market model, various non-
ompetitive models predict a positive relationship between wages of
omparable workers and the performance of their firms. Collective bar-
aining, optimal labor contract and search-theoretic models of the labor
arket share this theoretical conjecture, and consider different channels
hrough which employer ’s ability to pay might affect wages. 
We can view the wage determination equations specifying the ex-
ected positive wage-performance link as reduced-form models stem-
ing from, or at least compatible with, such an underlying variety of
heoretical structural models. Many empirical studies have estimated
hese reduced-form wage equations on firm data to test the rent-sharing
ypothesis. 1 They have confirmed without exception that changes in☆ We gratefully acknowledge the insightful comments and suggestions by the 
ditor, Etienne Wasmer, and an anonymous referee. We also thank Pieter Gau- 
ier, Bronwyn Hall, Daniel S. Hamermesh, Roland Iwan Luttens, and other 
articipants at various conferences and seminars for valuable discussions. We 
re also grateful to INSEE ( “Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes 
conomiques ”) for providing access to the data while the first author was visit- 
ng CREST. 
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E-mail address: sabien.dobbelaere@vu.nl (S. Dobbelaere). 
1 See in particular Barth et al. (2016) for the US; Abowd and 
emieux (1993) for Canada; Teal (1996) for Ghana; Van Reenen (1996) and 
ildreth (1998) for the UK; Goos and Konings (2001) and Brock and 
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927-5371/© 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. rm performance feed through into changes in wages. In general, the
stimated elasticities between wages and rents or profits per employee
ange between 0.05, even less, and 0.20, depending in particular on
he quality of the instruments used to control for the endogeneity of
rofits. Following the seminal contribution of Abowd et al. (1999) ,
ore recent studies using matched employer-employee datasets, are
ble to include separately in the wage equations firm and worker ef-
ects that take into account the non-random sorting of high-ability (and
hus high-wage) workers into high-profit firms. Compared to studies
ased on firm-level data only, these studies typically obtain, as ex-
ected, smaller estimates of wage-profit elasticities ranging from 0.01
o 0.10. 2 
Even more recently, a small set of productivity studies have extended
he more standard productivity framework with imperfect competition
n the product market to encompass two polar models of wage determi-ickell and Andrews (1983) and Hildreth and Oswald (1997) for a sam- 
le of European countries. 
2 See in particular Margolis and Salvanes (2001) for France and Norway; 
ramarz (2003) and Fakhfakh and Fitzroy (2004) for France; Bronars and Famu- 
ari (2001) for the US; Arai (2003) , Nekby (2003) , Arai and Heyman (2009) and 
arlsson et al. (2016) for Sweden; Bagger et al. (2014) for Denmark, Rycx and 
ojerow (2004) and Du Caju et al. (2011) for Belgium; Guertzgen (2009) for 
ermany; Card et al. (2014) for Italy; and Cardoso and Portela (2009) , 
artins (2009) and Card et al. (2018) for Portugal. 
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Graph 1. Comparative analysis sample: IC-EB regime. 
Notes: Product market settings: PC refers to perfect or “nearly perfect ” com- 
petition and IC to imperfection competition, labor market settings: PR refers 
to perfect or “nearly perfect ” competition or right-to-manage bargaining, EB 
to efficient bargaining and MO to monopsony. 𝜇: price-cost markup, 𝜓 : joint 
market imperfections parameter. PC-PR: 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and −0 . 1 ≤ 𝜓 ≤ 0 . 1 , PC- 
EB: 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and 𝜓 > 0.1, PC-MO: 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and 𝜓 < −0 . 1 , IC-PR: 𝜇 > 1.1 




















ation in imperfect labor markets. 3 These studies have also been able to
rovide estimates of the extent of rent sharing between firms and work-
rs, and more specifically estimates of the corresponding wage-profit
lasticities which are higher, in the [0.10-0.50] range. 4 
Our contribution to the empirical rent-sharing literature in this paper
s to compare the rent-sharing estimates obtained in the case of French
anufacturing for a large matched firm-worker panel data sample by
elying on the wage determination and the productivity models. It is
lso to suggest potential explanations for the estimated discrepancies
nd to assess the advantages and shortcomings of both types of models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the two
conometric models while Section 3 describes the data and explains the
ethod of estimation. Section 4 compares and discusses estimates of
he extent of rent sharing that we obtain from estimating the produc-
ivity and wage equations. Section 5 provides potential explanations of
iscrepancies between these estimates while Section 6 concludes. 
. Estimating rent sharing from two econometric models 
We present in this Section the econometric reduced-form productiv-
ty and wage determination models as they have been usually specified
n the literature and as we take them here to the data to better compare
he estimates of extent of rent sharing they entail. 
.1. Reduced-form model of productivity 
The specification of the reduced-form productivity equation we esti-
ate is the following log-linear regression: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇[ 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝑠 𝑀𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑚 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 )] + 𝜓[ 𝑠 𝑁𝑖𝑡 ( 𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 )] 
+ 𝜆𝑘 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (1) 
here i is a firm subscript and t a year subscript. The variables q it , n it , m it 
nd k it are respectively for each year the logarithms of output Q it , labor
 it , material input M it and capital K it . s Nit and s Mit are for each year the
hares of labor costs and material costs in total revenue. The parame-
ers 𝜇, 𝜓 and 𝜆 are respectively the parameters of price-cost markup,
oint product and labor market imperfections and elasticity of scale. 𝜔 it 
s an index of “true ” total factor productivity, or productivity for short,
ossibly observed by the firm at t when input choices are made, but un-
bserved to the econometrician. 𝛼i is a firm-specific effect proxying for
rm unobserved heterogeneity such as managerial ability differences,
t is a year effect proxying for changes in firms ’ industrial environment,
nd 𝜖it is an idiosyncratic error term including non-predictable output
hocks and potential measurement error in output and inputs. 
As explained in Section 1 of the online supplementary material, we
an distinguish six combinations or regimes of imperfect and “perfect
r nearly perfect ” competition in product and labor markets, which
re based on the respective values of the price-cost mark-up and joint
arket imperfections parameters 𝜇 and 𝜓 . We differentiate imperfect
nd nearly perfect product market settings on the basis of a price-cost3 This extension of the econometric productivity model to take into account 
mperfect labor markets has been developed in Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013) , 
fter a first extension by Crépon et al. (2005) , and following the revival 
f the empirical literature on productivity with imperfect product markets 
 Hall, 1988 ). Both extensions of econometric productivity analyses with im- 
erfectly competitive product and labor markets find their historical roots in 
arschak and Andrews (1944) . 
4 Dobbelaere and Vancauteren (2014) use firm-level data for Belgium and the 
etherlands, Dobbelaere et al. (2015) for France, Japan and the Netherlands, 
obbelaere et al. (2016) for Chile and France, Dobbelaere and Kiyota (2017) for 
apan and Félix and Portugal (2017) for Portugal. Dobbelaere (2004) , 
braham et al. (2009) , Boulhol et al. (2011) and Ahsan and Mitra (2014) im- 
lement the extension of the econometric productivity model developed in 










19 arkup 𝜇 higher than 1.1. Similarly, we separate the two settings of im-
erfect competition in the labor market, efficient bargaining and monop-
ony, from nearly perfect competition or right-to-manage bargaining in
he labor market on the basis of a joint market imperfections parame-
er 𝜓 respectively positive and higher than 0.1 or negative and smaller
han −0 . 1 . These threshold values, although conventional, are empiri-
ally reasonable. They also have the practical advantage of characteriz-
ng the different regimes as subsets of dimension 2 in the space of the
wo parameters 𝜇 and 𝜓 (with 𝜇≥ 1), and they thus put the different
egimes on a par when estimating their probability and testing that an
ndustry or a selected group of firms belongs to a particular regime.
he six regimes that we can thus consider are shown in Graph 1 in the
wo-dimensional space of the parameters 𝜇 and 𝜓 . 
More precisely, they are the following: 
• 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and −0 . 1 ≤ 𝜓 ≤ 0 . 1 , or PC-PR, corresponding to perfect
or “nearly perfect ” competition in the product market, and perfect
or “nearly perfect ” competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the
labor market. 
• 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and 𝜓 > 0.1, or PC-EB, corresponding to perfect or “nearly
perfect ” competition in the product market, and efficient bargaining
in the labor market. 
• 1 ≤ 𝜇≤ 1.1 and 𝜓 < −0 . 1 , or PC-MO, corresponding to perfect or
“nearly perfect ” competition in the product market, and monopsony
in the labor market. 
• 𝜇 > 1.1 and −0 . 1 ≤ 𝜓 ≤ 0 . 1 , or IC-PR, corresponding to imperfect
competition in the product market, and perfect or “nearly perfect ”
competition or right-to-manage bargaining in the labor market. 
• 𝜇 > 1.1 and 𝜓 > 0.1, or IC-EB, corresponding to imperfect compe-
tition in the product market, and efficient bargaining in the labor
market. 
• 𝜇 > 1.1 and 𝜓 < −0 . 1 , or IC-MO, corresponding to imperfect compe-
tition in the product market, and monopsony in the labor market. 
Here, for the sake of comparison, we focus our analysis on the set of
ndustries in which we expect that rent sharing is likely to prevail (IC-
B) on the basis of descriptive statistics as well as previous econometric
tudies where the estimates we found for the parameter of joint market




















































































































d  mperfections 𝜓 were positive. In this case, the parameter of main inter-
st is the absolute extent of rent sharing sharing 𝜙 or equivalently the
elative extent of rent sharing 𝛾 with 𝛾 = 𝜙1− 𝜙 and 𝜙 = 
𝛾
1+ 𝛾 , which are
stimated by: 
= 𝜓 
𝜇 + 𝜓 
and 𝛾 = 𝜓 
𝜇
(2)
.2. Reduced-form model of wage determination 
The specification of the reduced-form wage determination equation
s a log-log regression model that slightly differs depending on whether
e estimate it on firm or matched firm-worker data. It can be written
s Eq. (3) in the case of firm data: 
 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑤 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 
(




𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 
)
+ 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (3)
nd as Eq. (4) in the case of matched firm-worker data: 
 𝑗( 𝑖 ) 𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑤 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 
(




𝑘 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 
)
+ 𝛼𝑗( 𝑖 ) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (4)
here i is a firm subscript and t a year subscript and j ( i ) a subscript of
orker j in firm i . The variables w it , w j ( i ) t , 𝑤 𝑖𝑡 , 𝜋it , k it and n it are respec-
ively for each year the logarithms of the firm labor cost per worker or
verage wage W it , the net earnings of worker j in firm i or the net wage
 j ( i ) t , the average workers ’ alternative wage or reservation wage 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 ,
he firm profit or more generally economic rents Πit , the firm capital K it ,
nd the firm number of employees N it . The parameters 𝛽1 , 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are
he elasticities of wages with respect to the reservation wage, profit per
mployee and capital per employee, respectively. 𝛼i is the firm effect,
j ( i ) the worker-firm effect, 𝛼t the year effect and 𝜖it an idiosyncratic
rror. 
In the empirical literature, Eqs. (3) and (4) are commonly specified
s a log-log regression in which case the relative extent of rent sharing
is a varying parameter equal to the wage-profit elasticity 𝛽2 multi-
lied by 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑖𝑡 = 
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 ×𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
Π𝑖𝑡 
, the ratio of the firm wage bill to its prof-
ts. 5 For our purpose of comparison, we compare 𝛾 as estimated in the
roductivity regression ( Eq. (1) ) with its sample average values as es-
imated in the wage regressions ( Eqs. (3) and (4) ): 𝛾 = 𝛽2 × 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 with
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = mean 
(
𝑊 𝑖𝑡 ×𝑁 𝑖𝑡 
Π𝑖𝑡 
)
. The log specification of the wage regressions
as econometric advantages, in particular by normalizing the wage dis-
ributions which are skewed to the right and display long right tails
 Martins, 2007; Neal and Rosen, 2000 ). Adopting a log specification of
oth the productivity and wage equations is also appropriate in our case
ince it allows us to control for a potential source of discrepancy in the
orresponding estimates of extent of rent sharing. 
In practice, Eqs. (3) and (4) usually do not include the capital inten-
ity variable and we also consider an estimation variant without it. We
hink it is preferable to take it here into account to control at least partly
or differences in firms ’ labor skill composition and the possibility that
ent sharing is relatively higher in capital-intensive firms. Skill-intensive
rms will also be capital-intensive in industries where capital and skilled
abor are complements ( Bronars and Famulari, 2001; Duffy et al., 2004;
riliches, 1969 ). This implies that the wage-profit elasticity estimates
ill be upwardly biased for lack of suitable skill composition data but
ess so if we control for firm capital intensity. Note, in a related way,
hat such skill bias is likely to be largely controlled for when we take
nto account the non-random sorting of high-ability (hence high-wage)
orkers into high-productivity (hence high-profit) firms by relying on
atched firm-worker data. We thus expect that the wage-profit elas-
icity will be less upwardly biased (hence smaller) when estimated in
egression (4) than in regression (3) . 5 Note that if Eqs. (3) and (4) were specified as linear regressions, the param- 
ter 𝛽2 would simply be the parameter of relative extent of rent sharing, con- 
itional on considering collective bargaining, among the various interpretative 
chemes, to be the main theoretical engine establishing a positive relationship 
etween profitability and pay. This can be clearly seen from Eq. (20) in the 







20 . Data description and econometric identification 
.1. Comparative analysis sample and measurement of variables 
We have constructed an unbalanced panel of French manufactur-
ng firms over the period 1984-2001, based on confidential databases
aintained by INSEE (the French “Institut National de la Statistique
t des Etudes Economiques ”): mainly firm accounting information from
AE ( “Enquête Annuelle d ’Entreprise ”), supplemented by matched firm-
orker data drawn from the DADS (the administrative database of “Déc-
arations Annuelles des Données Sociales ”). We first trimmed the data
o eliminate outliers and anomalies for our main variables: firm output
nd input growth rates, firm input shares in total revenue, firm average
ages and profits, and worker net earnings. We then only kept firms
ith consecutive observations for at least four years and retained work-
rs who remained in the same firms ( “stayers ”), worked twelve months
er year and with consecutive observations for at least two years. We
lso retained the subset of 25 industries where we expect rent sharing
o be predominant, chosen among the full set of 52 manufacturing in-
ustries defined on the basis of the 2- and 3-digit level of the French in-
ustrial classification ( “Nomenclature économique de synthèse ”). This
ubset amounts to 66% of the firms and 58% of employment in total
anufacturing. 
We thus end up with a matched firm-worker panel data sample, con-
isting at the firm level of 109,199 observations for 9,849 firms over the
8 years 1984–2001, with a median number of observations per firm
f 11, and at the worker-firm level of 382,501 observations for 60,294
orkers in the 9,849 firms, with a median number of 9 workers per firm.
The eleven variables involved in our regression analyses are defined
nd measured in the following way. Output ( Q it ) is defined as current
roduction deflated by the two-digit producer price index. Labor ( N it )
efers to the average number of employees in each firm for each year.
aterial input ( M it ) is defined as intermediate consumption deflated by
he two-digit intermediate consumption price index. The capital stock
 K it ) is measured by the gross book value of tangible fixed assets at the
eginning of the year and adjusted for inflation. The shares of labor
 s Nit ) and material input ( s Mit ) are constructed by dividing respectively
he firm total labor cost and intermediate consumption by the firm cur-
ent production and by taking the average of these ratios over adjacent
ears. The firm average wage per worker ( W it ) is computed as the wage
ill divided by the average number of employees. The worker net wage
 W j ( i ) t ) is the yearly net earnings of worker j in firm i and the number
f workers ( N j ( i ) t ) refers to the number of individual workers observed
or firm i in the matched firm-worker sample. The firm profits ( Πit ) is
imply the widely used measure of gross operating profit computed as
alue added minus labor costs, smoothed over four or five years if pos-
ible from year 𝑡 − 3 or 𝑡 − 4 to current year t (taking advantage of the
vailability of three year pre-sample accounting firm observations when
ecessary). Such smoothing, often done in practice, is useful to control
or the high volatility of profits. Finally, we rely on the matched firm-
orker data to propose a measure of the average workers ’ alternative
age ( 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 ) for the two wage regressions. In particular, we proxy the
lternative wage by the 5th percentile of the workers ’ wage distribution
ut also consider an estimation variant in which it is measured by the
st percentile. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all our variables: mean, stan-
ard deviation, and first quartile, median and third quartile. The median
umber of employees is 49 and the mean number 123, while the me-
ian number of individual workers observed per firm is 9 and the mean
umber 21. The average yearly growth rate over the period 1984–2001
f firm output, number of employees, materials and capital are respec-
ively 2.6%, 0.9%, 4.4% and 0.3%. The average shares of labor and
aterials in total revenue are of 33% and 49%. The median and mean
re both of about 27,000 Euros for the workers ’ wage per year and re-
pectively about 13,500 and 16,000 Euros for their net earnings, while
S. Dobbelaere, J. Mairesse Labour Economics 52 (2018) 18–26 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics: Comparative analysis sample, 1984-2001. 
Variables Mean sd Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 N 
Real firm output growth rate ( Δq it ) 0.026 0.150 − 0.058 0.022 0.108 96,508 
Labor growth rate ( Δn it ) 0.009 0.126 − 0.042 0.000 0.060 96,508 
Materials growth rate ( Δm it ) 0.044 0.194 − 0.061 0.039 0.145 96,508 
Capital growth rate ( Δk it ) 0.003 0.154 − 0.072 − 0.018 0.067 96,508 
Labor share in nominal output ( s Nit ) 0.328 0.136 0.231 0.314 0.407 109,199 
Materials share in nominal output ( s Mit ) 0.494 0.150 0.401 0.502 0.599 109,199 
Profits per employee ( Π
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑡 19,392 24,491 6,790 12,678 23,309 109,199 





19,734 22,939 7,958 13,415 23,512 109,199 
Firm average number of employees ( N it ) 123 255 32 49 116 109,199 
Firm average wage per worker ( W it ) 27,381 7,612 21,944 26,667 31,907 109,199 
Wage premium ( 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑊 𝑖𝑡 ) 8,103 6,283 3,662 7,023 11,372 109,199 
Number of employees ( N j ( i ) t ) 21 42 3 9 22 382,501 
Average wage per worker ( W j ( i ) t ) 15,919 8,882 10,807 13,690 18,046 382,501 





is defined as 1 
5 
𝑡 ∑










𝑘 = 𝑡 −3 
( Π
𝑁 
) 𝑖𝑘 (taking advantage of the availability of three year pre- 







































































6 As the validity of GMM crucially hinges on the assumption that the in- 
struments are exogenous, we use the Sargan and Hansen test statistics for the 
joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions. In addition to the Hansen test 
evaluating the entire set of overidentifying restrictions/instruments, we provide 
difference-in-Hansen statistics to test the validity of subsets of instruments. De- 
tails on testing for instrument exogeneity are provided in Section 3 in the online 
supplementary material. 
7 Following Abowd et al. (1999) , the degree of assortative matching (or sort- 
ing) in the labor market is typically assessed by calculating the empirical corre- hey amount to about 13,500 and 20,000 Euros per year for smoothed
rofits per employee. 
.2. Econometric identification and estimation 
In the reduced-form productivity regression ( Eq. (1) ), we cannot as-
ume that the input factor variables n it , m it and k it are exogenous, even
hen we control for firm effects, and we cannot in general rely on or-
inary least squares (OLS) estimation, even if we control for firm fixed
ffects by relying on the time dimension of the panel (i.e., the first-
ifference or within-firm dimension of the data). The crux of the identifi-
ation problem inherent in estimating Eq. (1) is that a firm ’s choice of in-
uts ( n it , m it , k it ) will likely depend on realized firm-specific productivity
 it , which only the firm observes. Hence, we have to use an instrumen-
al variable (IV) estimation method (as emphasized in the econometric
roduction function literature since Marschak and Andrews, 1944 ; see
lso Griliches and Mairesse, 1998; Ackerberg et al., 2015 ). Similarly,
e cannot assume that in the wage regressions ( Eqs. (3) and (4) ), the
ight-hand-side variables, in particular the profit-per-employee variable
𝜋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑛 𝑖𝑡 
)
, are exogenous. Hence, they need to be instrumented. The en-
ogeneity of profits is due to two sources of reverse causality. First, the
age-profit elasticity (the parameter 𝛽2 in Eqs. (3) and (4) ) might be
nderestimated due to the accounting relationship between wages and
rofits, implying that higher wages lead to lower profits. Second, theo-
ies of incentive pay and efficiency wages ( Akerlof and Yellen, 1986;
hapiro and Stiglitz, 1984 ) predict that higher wages might lead to
igher profits, which could generate an upward bias in wage-profit elas-
icities. 
In order to get consistent estimates of the parameters in the produc-
ivity and wage equations, we apply the system generalized method of
oments (SYS–GMM) estimation method, developed by Arellano and
over (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , which is designed for
anels with relatively small time and large cross-sectional dimensions,
ovariates that are not strictly exogenous, unobserved heterogeneity,
eteroscedasticity and within-firm autocorrelation. This method ex-
ends the first-differenced GMM estimation method of Arellano and
ond (1991) , by relying on a richer set of orthogonality conditions,
hich are obtained not only by using lagged variables in levels to in-
trument the equation written in first-differences, but also by using the
agged variables in first-differences to instrument the original equation
n levels. Actually, to avoid instrument proliferation, we only exploit21 he orthogonality conditions entailing as instruments the 2- and 3-year
ags of variables in levels and the 1-year lag of the first-differenced vari-
bles. We also use the two-step SYS–GMM estimator which is asymptot-
cally more efficient than the one-step SYS–GMM estimator and robust
o heteroscedasticity, and the finite-sample correction to the two-step
ovariance matrix developed by Windmeijer (2005) . 6 
Data limitations precluded us from using exogenous firm demand
hifters as a source of variation in input demands to obtain consistent
stimates of the parameters in the reduced-form productivity equation
 Eq. (1) ). We follow a common instrumentation strategy in the liter-
ture, which is using lagged internal values. More explicitly, we use
uitable past levels and differences of input factors as instruments for
urrent inputs. This instrumentation strategy can be theoretically justi-
ed through adjustment costs generating dependence of current input
evels on past realizations of productivity shocks (see Bond and Söder-
om, 2005 ). Similarly, we lack exogenous firm demand shifters as a
ource of variation of profits that does not impact directly upon wages.
herefore, we follow common practice and use lagged values of firm
rofitability as instruments (see e.g. Blanchflower et al., 1996; Hildreth
nd Oswald, 1997 ), which in our case are suitable past levels and dif-
erences of the smoothed profits-per-employee variable. 
We have chosen to restrict estimation of the wage-profit elasticity
 𝛽2 ) in Eq. (4) to workers staying in the same firms over several years.
ore specifically, we control for both an unobserved firm fixed effect
i and an unobserved worker within firm fixed effect 𝛼j ( i ) , or unob-
erved spell effect 𝜃𝑠 = 𝛼𝑗( 𝑖 ) + 𝛼𝑖 for each unique worker-firm combina-
ion ( Andrews et al., 2006 ). We do not separately control for unobserved
rm fixed effects and unobserved worker fixed effects, and do not com-
ute their empirical correlation, as is often done in matched employer-
mployee panel data analyses (see Abowd et al., 1999 and related ref-
rences) 7 . This choice is grounded on a data reason and an econometric











































































































i  ne. The first is that separate identification of these types of unobserved
xed effects relies on workers who move between employers and that
e can only trace the mobility of workers from one firm to another for
 too small part of our sample. 8 The second is that the separate identifi-
ation requires exogeneity of worker mobility, which is not likely to be
he case or would need having information on the reasons for mobility
nd being able to implement some form of instrumentation ( Gibbons
nd Katz, 1992; Goux and Maurin, 1999 ; Murphy and Topel, 1987). 
. Results of comparative analysis 
We compare and discuss in this Section the industry-level esti-
ates of relative and absolute extent of rent sharing ?̂? and 𝜙 that
e obtain from the productivity and two wage regressions ( Eqs. (1) ,



















, where subscript I varying from 1 to 25
tands for the different industries of our matched firm-worker panel.






are computed using the Delta
ethod ( Wooldridge, 2002 ). 9 Details on estimates of output elasticities,
age-profit elasticities and other parameter estimates are relegated to
ection 3 in the online supplementary material. 






. We see that while they vary between a minimum of about 0.10






ary between negative or zero values in three industries ( − 0.10, − 0.05






vary between negative and a value of less than 0.05
n ten industries and a maximum of about respectively 0.85 and 0.45. A
isual representation of the sampling distribution of the rent-sharing es-
imates is given in Graph 2 . These box plots summarize well the average
verall picture by abstracting from “outlier ” industry estimates. They
how that the three sets of estimates differ clearly in average, although
hey tend to overlap slightly. In the case of the productivity regression,
e find median industry estimates of relative and absolute extent of rent
haring of respectively 0.41 and 0.29 to be compared to 0.19 and 0.16
n the case of the firm-level wage regression and 0.09 and 0.08 in the
ase of the worker-firm wage regression. The evidence is roughly that
f a difference of 0.1 between the estimates from the two wage equa-
ions, and of 0.2 or 0.3 between them and the ones from the productivity
quation. 
Beyond their overall differences, Tables 3 and 4 provide a compre-
ensive view of the similarity of the sampling distributions of the three














igh and statistically significant at the 10% level of confidence. These
orrelations are about 0.35 for the usual Spearman ’s rank correlation
oefficients and respectively 0.28 and 0.41 for the robust “bi-weight
id-correlation ” or Wilcox (2012) coefficients. They are also sizeable












. They are about 0.25 for both the Spearman and Wilcox coeffi-
ients and statistically significant at the 5% or 10% level of confidenceation between worker and firm fixed effects (see e.g. Goux and Maurin (1999) , 
bowd et al. (2004) and Abowd et al. (2009) for France and the US; Gruetter and 
alive (2009) for Austria, Andrews et al. (2008) for Germany; and Sørensen and 
ejlin (2013) for Denmark). Woodcock (2015) provides evidence on assortative 
atching for the US by directly controlling for an interaction effect between the 
orker and the firm. 
8 Andrews et al. (2008, 2012) show that the downward bias in the estimated 
orrelation between worker and firm fixed effects is larger when there are fewer 
overs in the data (labelled “limited mobility bias ”) using German data. 
9 Dropping subscripts, 
(
𝜎?̂?
)2 = ( 𝑠 𝑀 
𝑠 𝑁 + 𝑠 𝑀 −1 


































= ( 𝜎?̂? ) 
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(1+ ̂𝛾) 4 
where ̂𝜀 𝑄 
𝑁 
and ̂𝜀 𝑄 
𝑀 
are the estimated output elasticities with 



























are small, even negative of
bout − 0.05, for the Spearman coefficients, and they are positive and
izeable of about 0.30 and 0.20, if not statistically significant, for the
ilcox coefficients. This is a mixed picture, but not a bad one if we
ake into consideration that these correlations are computed for distri-
utions of 25 estimates only, and they concern a subset of very diverse
nd heterogeneous industries. 
Table 4 gives the mean, first quartile Q 1 , median Q 2 and third quar-
ile Q 3 of the three sets of industry estimates of rent sharing. It shows
hat the differences between them in the mid-range of their distribution,
rom Q 1 to Q 3 , are roughly the same as already mentioned for the me-
ian: of 0.1 between the estimates from the two wage equations, and of
.2 or 0.3 between them and the ones for the productivity equation. The
rst quartile value of ̂𝛾
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑤 
𝐼 
is the only noteworthy exception to such
early constant shift. By itself, it suggests that a common omitted vari-
ble misspecification, namely workers ’ skills, could be a potential ex-
lanation to the extent that it would affect the three sets of rent-sharing
stimates differentially. This is what we try to substantiate among other
 priori sources of discrepancies in the next Section. 
. Potential sources of discrepancies between rent-sharing 
stimates 
We can a priori distinguish three large categories of reasons or
ources of discrepancies that we find between the distributions of the
ndustry rent-sharing parameters as estimated on the basis of the pro-
uctivity and wage determination regressions ( Eqs. (1) , (3) and (4) ). 
A first category is economic specification errors, which involve omit-
ed relevant variables as well as poor measurement of included available
ariables. An important case, for the wage regressions, particularly for
egression (3) , is the omission of a variable or group of variables of
orkers ’ skills because of the lack of suitable skill composition data at
he firm level. We expect that rent sharing is higher in skill-intensive
rms, and hence that wage-profit elasticities will be upwardly biased in
he absence of skill variables in the two wage regressions. Actually, the
mission of skill variables is the most likely source of the smaller esti-
ates of rent sharing found with regression (4) than with regression (3) .
s already explained, the specification of these two regressions is basi-
ally the same, their main difference being that they are estimated at
he worker-firm level and firm-level of our matched firm-worker panel
ata sample. At the worker-firm level, we can expect that the worker-
rm effect is positively correlated with the worker ’s skills. We know in
act that the assortative matching of firms and workers is non-random,
nd that high-skilled (and thus high-wage) workers tend to be selected
nto high-productive (and thus high-profit) firms ( Abowd et al., 1999;
ard et al., 2018 ). 
As already mentioned, the introduction of the capital-per-employee
ariable in the two wage regressions is largely to proxy for the omission
f skill variables. As capital-intensive firms will also be skill-intensive
n industries where capital and skilled labor are complements, we ex-
ect that wage-profit elasticity estimates will be less upwardly biased
or lack of skill variables when the capital-per-employee variable is in-
luded in the wage regressions. This is indeed confirmed if we esti-
ate them without this variable. We find that the mean (or median)






increase respectively from 0.17 to 0.25 (0.16 to 0.23) and
rom 0.10 to 0.14 (0.08 to 0.15), that is, in average by about respec-
ively 50% and 40% (by about respectively 45% and 90%). In terms of
omparison with the productivity regression industry estimates, when
e do not include the capital-per-employee variable in the two wage re-
ressions, the differences between the mean (or median) industry-level









decrease in average by about respectively 65% and 20% (by
bout respectively 55% and 35%). 
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Table 2 
















) extent of rent- 
sharing parameters. 
Reduced-form model of productivity Reduced-form model of wage determination 
Dep. var.: Firm wage w it Dep. var.: Worker wage w j ( i ) t 


















17 Articles of paper and 
paperboard 
0.115 (0.196) 0.103 (0.158) − 0.037 (0.056) − 0.039 (0.060) 0.058 (0.050) 0.054 (0.045) 
19 Plastic products 0.141 (0.138) 0.124 (0.106) − 0.101 (0.135) − 0.112 (0.167) 0.199 (0.089) 0.166 (0.062) 
8 Metal products for 
construction 
0.210 (0.372) 0.173 (0.254) 0.517 (0.608) 0.341 (0.264) 0.849 (0.440) 0.459 (0.129) 
13 Earthenware products and 
construction material 
0.231 (0.129) 0.188 (0.085) 0.187 (0.088) 0.158 (0.062) 0.124 (0.062) 0.111 (0.049) 
4 Publishing, (re)printing 0.255 (0.157) 0.203 (0.099) 0.210 (0.203) 0.174 (0.139) − 0.170 (0.113) − 0.204 (0.164) 
12 Mining of metal ores, other 
mining n.e.c. 
0.286 (0.115) 0.223 (0.069) 0.106 (0.142) 0.096 (0.116) 0.086 (0.072) 0.079 (0.061) 
21 Production of non-ferrous 
metals 
0.291 (0.279) 0.225 (0.168) 0.041 (0.093) 0.039 (0.086) 0.007 (0.058) 0.007 (0.057) 
16 Pulp, paper and paperboard 0.316 (0.354) 0.240 (0.204) 0.137 (0.134) 0.120 (0.104) 0.252 (0.094) 0.202 (0.060) 
11 Medical and surgical 
equipment and orthopaedic 
appliances 
0.317 (0.578) 0.241 (0.333) 0.387 (0.472) 0.279 (0.245) 0.333 (0.267) 0.250 (0.150) 
20 Basic iron and steel 0.319 (0.220) 0.242 (0.127) 0.004 (0.225) 0.004 (0.224) − 0.053 (0.052) − 0.056 (0.058) 
1 Other food products 0.369 (0.150) 0.269 (0.080) 0.224 (0.151) 0.183 (0.101) 0.089 (0.085) 0.082 (0.072) 
3 Leather goods and footwear 0.373 (0.278) 0.272 (0.147) 0.378 (0.122) 0.274 (0.064) 0.142 (0.097) 0.124 (0.075) 
18 Rubber products 0.411 (0.341) 0.291 (0.171) 0.279 (0.118) 0.218 (0.072) 0.001 (0.045) 0.001 (0.045) 
6 Shipbuilding, construction of 
railway rolling stock, 
0.421 (0.519) 0.296 (0.257) 0.607 (0.160) 0.378 (0.062) 0.297 (0.149) 0.229 (0.089) 
bicycles, motorcycles, 
transport equipment n.e.c. 
7 Aircraft and spacecraft 0.469 (0.577) 0.319 (0.267) 0.116 (0.504) 0.104 (0.405) − 0.202 (0.105) − 0.253 (0.165) 
5 Furniture 0.478 (0.231) 0.323 (0.106) 0.189 (0.176) 0.159 (0.125) 0.249 (0.135) 0.199 (0.087) 
25 Electronics 0.479 (0.300) 0.324 (0.137) 0.425 (0.348) 0.298 (0.171) 0.710 (0.191) 0.415 (0.065) 
22 Ironware 0.482 (0.220) 0.325 (0.100) 0.171 (0.122) 0.146 (0.089) 0.013 (0.085) 0.013 (0.083) 
10 Other special purpose 
machinery 
0.550 (0.405) 0.355 (0.169) 0.200 (0.326) 0.167 (0.226) − 0.006 (0.172) − 0.006 (0.174) 
9 Ferruginous and steam boilers 0.599 (0.292) 0.374 (0.114) 0.462 (0.547) 0.316 (0.256) − 0.060 (0.196) − 0.064 (0.222) 
15 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 0.657 (0.321) 0.397 (0.117) 0.284 (0.287) 0.221 (0.174) − 0.054 (0.149) − 0.057 (0.167) 
24 Metal fabrication 0.685 (0.140) 0.406 (0.049) 0.124 (0.076) 0.110 (0.060) 0.034 (0.073) 0.033 (0.068) 
14 Spinning and weaving 0.809 (0.256) 0.447 (0.078) 0.124 (0.158) 0.110 (0.125) 0.290 (0.113) 0.225 (0.068) 
23 Industrial service to metal 
products 
0.810 (0.147) 0.447 (0.045) − 0.005 (0.176) − 0.005 (0.178) 0.085 (0.136) 0.078 (0.116) 
2 Clothing and skin goods 1.130 (0.223) 0.531 (0.049) 0.831 (0.215) 0.454 (0.064) 0.622 (0.190) 0.383 (0.072) 
Notes: The standard errors in parentheses measure the dispersion of the rent-sharing parameters at the level of firms making up the industry. The standard errors 






















with 𝛽2 the estimated wage-profit elasticity and Ratio = mean 
(











. Similar formulas apply if the dependent 

































their workers. A second category of potential sources of discrepancies between our
educed-form regression estimates of extent of rent sharing, which is
losely related to the first category, concerns estimation methods, in
articular the instrumentation strategy. Estimation of the productivity
nd the wage determination equations is based on exploiting different
oment conditions for identification. Since data limitations precluded
s from relying on external a priori exogenous instruments, we followed,
s we explained, the common method of using past differences and lev-
ls of the regression variables themselves to construct such moment
onditions. Since these variables are rather similar for the productivity
nd wage regressions, and hence the moment conditions based on their
agged differenced and level values are close, and since we have been
ttentive to check for their validity, it seems actually unlikely that esti-
ation methods could be a significant source of discrepancies between
ur rent-sharing estimates. 23 A third category relates to different underlying theoretical structural
odels, which are themselves specifically or loosely related to various
nterpretative schemes. As stressed from the outset, both the economet-
ic productivity and wage determination regressions are reduced-form
odels. Given that our main interest is in the assessment and compar-
son of firm-worker rent-sharing parameters, the reduced-form regres-
ions provide satisfactory results if the first and second categories of dis-
repancies remain unimportant, that is, if they are appropriately spec-
fied and estimated. At the same time, we cannot and do not analyze
he theoretical structural models which are possibly underlying these
educed-form models and are at least compatible with them. A conse-
uence is that we are not able to decide between different interpreta-
ive schemes of our results, nor are we in a position to pin down the
conomic mechanisms and channels of rent sharing between firms and
S. Dobbelaere, J. Mairesse Labour Economics 52 (2018) 18–26 
Graph 2. Relative and absolute extent of rent sharing parameters by econometric model. 
Notes: The box plots provide a summary of the sampling distributions of industry estimates of rent sharing. The upper and lower limits of the boxes represent 
the first and third quartiles of extent of rent-sharing parameter estimates while the median is represented by the diamond. Subscript “prod ” denotes rent-sharing 
estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of productivity. Subscript “wage,f ” denotes rent-sharing estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of wage 
determination using the firm average wage as the dependent variable. Subscript “wage,w ” denotes rent-sharing estimates obtained from the reduced-form model of 
wage determination using the worker ’s wage as the dependent variable. 
Table 3 
Correlation of industry-specific relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters across the reduced-form pro- 
ductivity model and the reduced-form model of wage determination. 













Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w it : ̂𝛾
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑓 
𝐼 
0.258 [0.253 ∗ ] 1.000 [1.000] 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w j ( i ) t : ̂𝛾
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑤 
𝐼 
− 0.074 [0.302] 0.350 ∗ [0.278 ∗ ] 1.000 [1.000] 













Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w it : 𝜙
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑓 
𝐼 
0.258 [0.266 ∗∗ ] 1.000 [1.000] 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w j ( i ) t : 𝜙
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑤 
𝐼 














, with 𝛽2 the estimated wage-profit elasticity and 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = mean 
(





















man ’s rank correlation is reported. Wilcox ’ robust correlation is reported in square brackets. ∗∗ significant at 5%, 
∗ significant at 10%. 
Table 4 
Comparison of the distribution of relative and absolute extent of rent-sharing parameters across the 
reduced-form productivity model and the reduced-form model of wage determination. 
Reduced-form econometric model Mean Q 1 Q 2 Q 3 
Relative extent of rent sharing 
Model of productivity ?̂?
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 
𝐼 
0.448 0.291 0.411 0.550 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w it ?̂?
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑓 
𝐼 
0.234 0.116 0.189 0.378 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w j ( i ) t ?̂?
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑤 
𝐼 
0.156 0.001 0.086 0.252 
Absolute extent of rent sharing 
Model of productivity 𝜙
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 
𝐼 
0.293 0.225 0.291 0.355 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w it 𝜙
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑓 
𝐼 
0.168 0.104 0.159 0.274 
Model of wage determination, dep. var. = w j ( i ) t 𝜙
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒,𝑤 
𝐼 














, with 𝛽2 the estimated wage-profit elasticity and 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = 
mean 
(











. Similar formulas apply if the dependent variable is the worker 



















































































































In the online supplementary material, we present one theoretical
tructural model behind the reduced-form productivity regression, in
hich case the interpretative scheme is collective bargaining. We also
resent three potential theoretical structural models which can substan-
iate the expected positive pay-performance link of the wage determina-
ion regressions: collective bargaining models, an optimal labor contract
odel and a search-theoretic model of the labor market. 10 In collective
argaining models, the existence and strength of workers ’ bargaining
ower, which can correspond to different practices, institutionalized or
ot, is central. 11 In optimal contract models in which both workers and
rms are risk-averse, the pay-performance link depends on the ratio of
oth parties ’ relative risk aversion parameters. 12 In two-sided search
odels with wage posting, the main source of rent sharing is competi-
ion between firms to attract workers. Firms have an incentive to hire
ore workers, thereby reducing search costs. 13 This incentive is particu-
arly pronounced for higher-productivity firms because they face larger
pportunity costs of search. 
Although the three structural models can be developed analytically,
heir econometric analyses, in particular so that they could be compared
ogether as well as with a structural productivity model with imperfec-
ions in product and labor markets, would be a formidable endeavor,
f only because of multiple data constraints. To give two examples, one
ould estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion from data on la-
or supply, but this would entail estimating wage and income elastici-
ies, which could be done on the condition of having data on exogenous
ariation in unearned income and wages due to tax changes or lottery
innings. Similarly, one could attempt to quantify the extent to which
earch costs may drive a positive pay-performance link on the condition
f having data on differential hiring activities across firms. 
. Conclusion 
The basic objective of this paper is to compare as closely as pos-
ible rent-sharing estimates based on a reduced-form wage determina-
ion model adopted in a large empirical literature on firm-worker rent-
haring with rent-sharing estimates based on a reduced-form productiv-
ty model developed more recently, which we consider as largely com-
lementary and which we think should provide reconcilable estimates.
rounded on a large matched firm-worker panel data sample, our main
nding is that industry distributions of rent-sharing estimates are well
orrelated and overlap, but are nonetheless significantly different on av-
rage. Precisely, looking at the average industry estimates of the extent
f rent-sharing parameter, we obtain an estimate of roughly 0.30 for the
roductivity regression and 0.17 for the wage determination regression
f we rely only on firm-level information. If we also take advantage of the
orker-level information to control for unobserved worker ability in the
odel of wage determination, thereby accounting for non-random sort-
ng of high-ability (and thus high-wage) workers into high-profit firms,
e find as expected a lower average value of 0.10. 
There are a priori three large categories of reasons or potential
ources of discrepancies that we find between the three types of esti-
ates: economic specification errors, which involve omitted relevant or
oorly measured variables; estimation methods, particularly instrumen-10 Note that an expected positive pay-performance link can be derived from at 
east two other models. One is a modified version of the competitive labor mar- 
et model with temporary frictions and a positively-sloped labor supply sched- 
le (see Blanchflower et al., 1996 ). The other is the efficiency wage model in 
hich increased productivity arises from reduced shirking and thus generates a 
ositive wage-profitability correlation ( Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984 ). 
11 In these models, the pay-performance relationship depends on the relative 
trengths of the bargaining parties (see Eq. (20) in the online supplementary 
aterial). 
12 See Eq. (27) in the online supplementary material. 












25 ation strategy; and different underlying theoretical structural models
elated to a variety of interpretative schemes. The idea of addressing
ll these potential sources of discrepancies in an encompassing model
ould be a formidable challenge, if only because of specific data re-
uirements. 
Renouncing to consider it, we can think of two interesting routes for
uture research. The first is to analyze and test separately the potential
ources of discrepancies between the econometric reduced-form produc-
ivity and wage determination models, for example, by trying to take ex-
licitly into account different workers ’ skills and by considering, more
enerally, that heterogeneity of firms and workers, of markets and in-
ustries is likely to be a dominant driving source of the discrepancies in
ur present estimates. The latter could be investigated on various sets of
pecific detailed datasets, corresponding to different periods, countries,
ndustries, labor and product markets. 
A complementary route of research is to empirically and specifically
elate the reduced-form productivity and wage regressions to their un-
erlying structural models by econometrically specifying and testing
hem in a multi-equation framework. There already exist many attempts
n such direction (e.g. Bughin, 1993; Bughin, 1996; Forlani et al., 2016;
aumandreu and Mairesse, 2010; Peters et al., 2017 ), but they still raise
umerous difficulties. Actually, in the case of the reduced-form pro-
uctivity regression, this endeavor brings us back to the paradigm of
arschak and Andrews (1944) . As such, it involves framing a structural
odel composed of a production function, a demand function, a pric-
ng rule, cost share equations for variable input factors, potentially tak-
ng into account some type of worker heterogeneity and separate wage
quations for different types of workers. 
upplementary material 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.labeco.2018.02.009 . 
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